Wiegmann, Alex

Publications

Papers available via Reserachgate

  • Wiegmann, A. (in press). Rezension zu: Meibauer, 2014: Lying at the Semantics Pragmatics Interface. Linguistische Schriften.
  • Wiegmann, A., Horvath, J., & Meyer, k. (in press). Intuitive Expertise and irrelevant options. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy., Volume III.
  • Kraft, T., & Wiegmann, A (2018). Folk epistemology and epistemic closure. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy., Volume II.
  • Wiegmann, A., Rutschmann, R., & Willemsen, P. (2017). Empirically investigating the concept of lying. In S. Stich, E. Machery & Joshua Knobe (Eds.), Special issue on Experimental Philosophy. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
  • Wiegmann, A., & Willemsen, P.  (2017). How the truth can make a great lie: An empirical investigation of lying by falsely implicating. In G. Gunzelmann, A. Howes, T. Tenbrink, & E. J. Davelaar (Eds.), Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 3516-3621). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
  • Rutschmann, R., & Wiegmann, A. (2017). No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), 434-453.
  • Osman, M., & Wiegmann, A. (2017). A minimal moral model. Experimental Psychology, 64, 68-81.
  • Wiegmann, A., & Osman, M. (2017). Factors Guiding Moral Judgment, Reason, Decision, and Action. Experimental Psychology, 64.
  • Waldmann, M. R., Wiegmann, A., & Nagel, J. (2017). Causal models mediate moral inferences. In J.-F. Bonnefort & B. Trémolière (Eds.), Moral inferences (pp. 37-55). London: Routledge.
  • Horvath, J., & Wiegmann, A. (2016). Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 10, 2701-2726.
  • Nagel, J., & Wiegmann, A. (2016). Moral intuitionism and empirical data. In C. Brand (Ed.), Dual-process theories in moral psychology: Interdisciplinary approaches to theoretical, empirical and practical considerations (pp. 185-206). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
  • Wiegmann, A., Samland, J., & Waldmann, M. R. (2016). Lying despite telling the truth. Cognition, 150, 37-42.
  • Wiegmann, A., & Meyer, K. (2015). When killing the heavy man seems right. Making people utilitarian by simply adding options to moral dilemmas. In D. C. Noelle, R. Dale, A. S. Warlaumont, J. Yoshimi, T. Matlock, C. D. Jennings, & P. P. Maglio (Eds.), Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2659-2654). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
  • Wiegmann, A., & Waldmann, M. R. (2014). Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory. Cognition, 131, 28-43.
  • Wiegmann, A., Lippold, M., & Grigull, R. (2013). On the robustness of intuitions in the two best-known trolley dilemmas. In M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz & I. Wachsmuth (Eds.), Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 3759-3764). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
  • Wiegmann, A., & Okan, J. (2012). Order effects in moral judgments. Searching for an explanation. In N. Miyake, D. Peebles, & R. P. Cooper (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1143-1148). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
  • Liao, S. M., Wiegmann, A., Alexander, J., & Vong, G. (2012). Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case. Philosophical Psychlogy.
  • Waldmann, M. R., & Wiegmann, A. (2012). The role of the primary effect in the assessment of intentionality and morality. In N. Miyake, D. Peebles, & R. P. Cooper (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1102-1107). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
  • Gräfenhain, M. & Wiegmann, A. (2012). The Scientific
    Study of Morals. In: Lütge, C. (Ed.), Handbook of the Philosophical
    Foundations of Business Ethics (chapter 81). Springer Press.
  • Wiegmann, A., Okan, Y., & Nagel, J. (2012). Order effects in moral judgment. Philosophical Psychology, 25, 823-836. 
  • Waldmann, M. R., Nagel, J., & Wiegmann, A. (2012). Moral judgment. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning (pp. 364-389). New York: Oxford University Press. 
  • Waldmann, M. R., & Wiegmann, A. (2010). A double causal contrast theory of moral intuitions in trolley dilemmas. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2589-2594). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
  • Wiegmann, A., Okan, Y., Nagel, J., & Mangold, S. (2010). Order effects in moral judgment. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2111-2116). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. 
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