Moral judgment.

The past decade has seen a renewed interest in moral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or overlapping phenomena. This review focuses on moral judgments and is written from the perspective of cognitive psychologists interested in theories of the cognitive and affective processes underlying judgments in moral domains. The review will first present and discuss a variety of different theoretical and empirical approaches, including both behavioral and neuroscientific studies. We will then show how these theories can be applied to a selected number of specific research topics that have attracted particular interest in recent years, including the distinction between moral and conventional rules, moral dilemmas, the role of intention, and sacred/protected values. One overarching question we will address throughout the chapter is whether moral cognitions are distinct and special, or whether they can be subsumed under more domain-general mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Accession Number: 2012-08871-019. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Waldmann, Michael R.; University of Gottingen, Department of Psychology, Gottingen, Germany. Release Date: 20130204. Publication Type: Book (0200), Edited Book (0280). Format Covered: Print. Document Type: Chapter. Book Type: Handbook/Manual. ISBN: 978-0-19-973468-9, Hardcover. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Judgment; Morality; Psychological Theories. Minor Descriptor: Cognitions; Cognitive Processes; Cognitive Psychology; Emotions. Classification: Cognitive Processes (2340). Population: Human (10). Intended Audience: Psychology: Professional & Research (PS). Methodology: Literature Review. References Available: Y. Page Count: 26.