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Knowledge about cause and effect relationships (e.g., virus- epidemic) is essential for predicting changes in the environment and for anticipating the consequences of events and one's own actions. Although there is evidence that predictions and learning from prediction errors are instrumental in acquiring causal knowledge, it is unclear whether prediction error circuitry remains involved in the mental representation and evaluation of causal knowledge already stored in semantic memory. In an fMRI study, participants assessed whether pairs of words were causally related (e.g., virus-epidemic) or noncausally associated (e.g., emerald-ring). In a second fMRI study, a task cue prompted the participants to evaluate either the causal or the noncausal associative relationship between pairs of words. Causally related pairs elicited higher activity in OFC, amygdala, striatum, and substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area than noncausally associated pairs. These regions were alsomore activated by the causal than by the associative task cue. This network overlaps with the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopaminergic network known to code prediction errors, suggesting that prediction error processing might participate in assessments of causality even under conditions when it is not explicitly required to make predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 17(1) of Animal Cognition (see record [rid]2014-00148-002[/rid]). In the original article, there are some errors the corrections are present in the erratum.] Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaquesʼ understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the coversʼ orientation. The macaques could use a boardʼs inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeysʼ performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theoryʼs key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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Most people consider it morally acceptable to redirect a trolley that is about to kill five people to a track where the trolley would kill only one person. In this situation, people seem to follow the guidelines of utilitarianism by preferring to minimize the number of victims. However, most people would not consider it moral to have a visitor in a hospital killed to save the lives of five patients who were otherwise going to die. We conducted two experiments in which we pinpointed a novel factor behind these conflicting intuitions. We show that moral intuitions are influenced by the locus of the intervention in the underlying causal model. In moral dilemmas, judgments conforming to the prescriptions of utilitarianism are more likely when the intervention influences the path of the agent of harm (e.g., the trolley) than when the intervention influences the path of the potential patient (i.e., victim). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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The main goal of the present research was to demonstrate the interaction between category and causal induction in causal model learning. We used a two-phase learning procedure in which learners were presented with learning input referring to two interconnected causal relations forming a causal chain (Experiment 1) or a common-cause model (Experiments 2a, b). One of the three events (i.e., the intermediate event of the chain, or the common cause) was presented as a set of uncategorized exemplars. Although participants were not provided with any feedback about category labels, they tended to induce categories in the first phase that maximized the predictability of their causes or effects. In the second causal learning phase, participants had the choice between transferring the newly learned categories from the first phase at the cost of suboptimal predictions, or they could induce a new set of optimally predictive categories for the second causal relation, but at the cost of proliferating different category schemes for the same set of events. It turned out that in all three experiments learners tended to transfer the categories entailed by the first causal relation to the second causal relation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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A. P. Blaisdell, K. Sawa, K. J. Leising, and M. R. Waldmann (2006) reported evidence for causal reasoning in rats. After learning through Pavlovian observation that Event A (a light) was a common cause of Events X (an auditory stimulus) and F (food), rats predicted F in the test phase when they observed Event X as a cue but not when they generated X by a lever press. Whereas associative accounts predict associations between X and F regardless of whether X is observed or generated by an action, causal-model theory predicts that the intervention at test should lead to discounting of A, the regular cause of X. The authors report further tests of causal-model theory. One key prediction is that full discounting should be observed only when the alternative cause is viewed as deterministic and independent of other events, 2 hallmark features of actions but not necessarily of arbitrary events. Consequently, the authors observed discounting with only interventions but not other observable events (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, rats were capable of flexibly switching between observational and interventional predictions (Experiment 3). Finally, discounting occurred on the very first test trial (Meta-Analysis). These results confirm causal-model theory but refute associative accounts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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Explored the cognitive foundations and the ontogenetic origins of the side-effect effect. Adults' intentionality judgments regarding an action are influenced by their moral evaluation of this action. This is clearly indicated in the so-called side-effect effect: when told about an action (for example, implementing a business plan) with an intended primary effect (for example, raise profits) and a foreseen side effect (for example, harming/helping the environment), subjects tend to interpret the bringing about of the side effect more often as intentional when it is negative (harming the environment) than when it is positive (helping the environment). From a cognitive point of view, it is unclear whether the side-effect effect is driven by the moral status of the side effects specifically, or rather more generally by its normative status. And from a developmental point of view, little is known about the ontogenetic origins of the effect. In this study, 54 four- to five-year-old children were tested with scenarios in which a side effect was in accordance with/violated a norm. Crucially, the status of the norm was varied to be conventional or moral. Results show that children rated the bringing about of side-effects as more intentional when it broke a norm than when it accorded with a norm irrespective of the type of norm. It is concluded that the side-effect effect is thus an early-developing, more general and pervasive phenomenon, not restricted to morally relevant side effects.
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Recent studies have shown that people have the capacity to derive interventional predictions for previously unseen actions from observational knowledge, a finding that challenges associative theories of causal learning and reasoning (e.g., Meder, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008). Although some researchers have claimed that such inferences are based mainly on qualitative reasoning about the structure of a causal system (e.g., Sloman, 2005), we propose that people use both the causal structure and its parameters for their inferences. We here employ an observational trial-by-trial learning paradigm to test this prediction. In Experiment 1, the causal strength of the links within a given causal model was varied, whereas in Experiment 2, base rate information was manipulated while keeping the structure of the model constant. The results show that learnersʼ causal judgments were strongly affected by the observed learning data despite being presented with identical hypotheses about causal structure. The findings show furthermore that participants correctly distinguished between observations and hypothetical interventions. However, they did not adequately differentiate between hypothetical and counterfactual interventions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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Scientists as well as nonscientists generate and test hypotheses about causal relations. There are two kinds of causal hypotheses, simple ones that refer to single causal relations and complex ones that refer to causal structures. Research on simple hypotheses has shown that people use statistical covariation information for their judgments in a normative fashion. Little is known, however, about how complex causal hypotheses are evaluated. According to normative theories, hypotheses about causal models require the evaluation of the strength of the individually hypothesized causal links along with tests that address the adequacy of the assumed causal structure. In 3 experiments it was investigated how participants tested complex causal hypotheses. The results showed that they tended to evaluate the individual causal links but appeared not to have any explicit knowledge about how hypotheses on the structure of causal models should be tested.
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Research on human causal induction has shown that people have general prior assumptions about causal strength and about how causes interact with the background. We propose that these prior assumptions about the parameters of causal systems do not only manifest themselves in estimations of causal strength or the selection of causes but also when deciding between alternative causal structures. In three experiments, we requested subjects to choose which of two observable variables was the cause and which the effect. We found strong evidence that learners have interindividually variable but intraindividually stable priors about causal parameters that express a preference for causal determinism (sufficiency or necessity; Experiment 1). These priors predict which structure subjects preferentially select. The priors can be manipulated experimentally (Experiment 2) and appear to be domain−general (Experiment 3). Heuristic strategies of structure induction are suggested that can be viewed as simplified implementations of the priors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
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Our research examines the normative and descriptive adequacy of alternative computational models of diagnostic reasoning from single effects to single causes. Many theories of diagnostic reasoning are based on the normative assumption that inferences from an effect to its cause should reflect solely the empirically observed conditional probability of cause given effect. We argue against this assumption, as it neglects alternative causal structures that may have generated the sample data. Our structure induction model of diagnostic reasoning takes into account the uncertainty regarding the underlying causal structure. A key prediction of the model is that diagnostic judgments should not only reflect the empirical probability of cause given effect but should also depend on the reasonerʼs beliefs about the existence and strength of the link between cause and effect. We confirmed this prediction in 2 studies and showed that our theory better accounts for human judgments than alternative theories of diagnostic reasoning. Overall, our findings support the view that in diagnostic reasoning people go 'beyond the information given' and use the available data to make inferences on the (unobserved) causal rather than on the (observed) data level. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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In the present research we analyze the interrelations of spatial distance and efficaciousness in helping needy others, and we investigate how these factors affect our judgments of moral helping obligations. The main question is under which conditions the location of an agent's means of helping relative to a victim is regarded as morally relevant. We develop a new experimental design that allows us to test our hypotheses concurrently in both separate and joint evaluation modes using a constant procedure across groups. We find that spatial proximity of an agent's means to a victim increases people's sense of obligation only to the extent to which it is indicative of increased efficaciousness or personal involvement.
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The ability to derive predictions for the outcomes of potential actions from observational data is one of the hallmarks of true causal reasoning. We present four learning experiments with deterministic and probabilistic data showing that people indeed make different predictions from causal models, whose parameters were learned in a purely observational learning phase, depending on whether learners believe that an event within the model has been merely observed ('seeing') or was actively manipulated ('doing'). The predictions reflect sensitivity both to the structure of the causal models and to the size of their parameters. This competency is remarkable because the predictions for potential interventions were very different from the patterns that had actually been observed. Whereas associative and probabilistic theories fail, recent developments of causal Bayes net theories provide tools for modeling this competency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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Das Zusammenwirken von Raum- und Ereignisschemata beim Erinnern von Alltagssituationen wird in einer Reihe von sechs Experimenten analysiert. Die Experimente wurden an insgesamt 424 studentischen Versuchspersonen durchgeführt. In den Experimenten wurden komplexe Räume gezeigt, die in jeweils zwei unabhängigen Bedingungen mit zwei unterschiedlichen Aktivitätstypen gepaart wurden. Wesentliche Ergebnisse waren: (1) Die nicht in Handlungen verwickelten Objekte hatten einen robusten Raumschemaeffekt. (2) Handlungsobjekte wurden generell gut erinnert. (3) Mit zunehmendem Behaltensintervall wurde die Gedächtnisleistung beim freien Erinnern schlechter. (4) Neben klar schemaabhängigen Handlungsintrusionen zeigten sich auch Intrusionen, die auf ein allgemeines Wohnraumschema zurückzuführen waren. (5) Auch die Befunde zum visuellen Wiedererkennen lieferten klare Hinweise auf Schemanutzungsprozesse. Aus den Befunden werden Konsequenzen für die zukünftige schematheoretische Forschung abgeleitet.
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We argue that conceptual problems arise with the parametric measure β when above- and below-chance data are aggregated or compared. Depending on the interpretation of β as a likelihood-ratio measure or an indicator of strictness or bias toward signal or noise, the original formula for β should be retained or modified. The response bias measure β can be retained only if it is interpreted as a likelihood-ratio measure. If it is interpreted as an indicator of strictness or bias toward signal or noise, the original formula has to be modified. One possible modified formula is suggested here. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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In two experiments, rats received sensory preconditioning treatment in which an auditory conditioned stimulus (CS) X was followed by visual CS A in Phase 1, and CS A was followed by an appetitive US (sucrose) in Phase 2. Rats also received presentations of auditory CS Y unpaired with other events. At test, rats looked for sucrose more following CS X than following CS Y on non-reinforced probe test trials only if the light bulb on which CS A had been presented during training was removed from the chamber at the time of testing. With the light bulb present (but unlit), rats showed no difference in amount of nose poking between CS X and CS Y. These results suggest that rats distinguish between the explicit absence of events and lack of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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In two experiments, rats received sensory preconditioning treatment in which an auditory conditioned stimulus (CS) X was followed by visual CS A in Phase 1, and CS A was followed by an appetitive US (sucrose) in Phase 2. Rats also received presentations of auditory CS Y unpaired with other events. At test, rats looked for sucrose more following CS X than following CS Y on non-reinforced probe test trials only if the light bulb on which CS A had been presented during training was removed from the chamber at the time of testing. With the light bulb present (but unlit), rats showed no difference in amount of nose poking between CS X and CS Y. These results suggest that rats distinguish between the explicit absence of events and lack of information
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The goal of three experiments was to study whether rats are aware of the difference between absence of events and lack of evidence. We used a Pavlovian extinction paradigm in which lights consistently signaling sucrose were suddenly paired with the absence of sucrose. The crucial manipulation involved the absent outcomes in the extinction phase. Whereas in the Cover conditions, access to the drinking receptacle was blocked by a metal plate, in the No Cover conditions, the drinking receptacle was accessible. The Test phase showed that in the Cover conditions, the measured expectancies of sucrose were clearly at a higher level than in the No Cover conditions. We compare two competing theories potentially explaining the findings. A cognitive theory interprets the observed effect as evidence that the rats were able to understand that the cover blocked informational access to the outcome information, and therefore the changed learning input did not necessarily signify a change of the underlying contingency in the world. An alternative associationist account, renewal theory, might instead explain the relative sparing of extinction in the Cover condition as a consequence of context change. We discuss the merits of both theories as accounts of our data and conclude that the cognitive explanation is in this case preferred. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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Humans are causal agents par excellence. But what are the psychological processes that have evolved to produce human causal cognition? And which aspects of causal cognition are uniquely human and which are shared with other species? This chapter describes how a computational model of causal inference, causal model theory, can usefully frame these questions and allow the design of experiments that can Illuminate the underlying psychological competencies. The model specifies procedures that allow organisms to go beyond the information given to distinguish causal from noncausal covariations. By using this model we assume that organisms such as rats and people have evolved to approximate rational causal inference. The chapter discusses experimental Investigations of rat behavior under conditions designed to test the predictions of causal model theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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In conclusion, rather than present a summary of the preceding chapters, nine eminent past presidents of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (SJDM) were invited to provide personal perspectives on the concept of judgment and decision making (JDM) as a dynamic skill. These scholars were not asked to comment on the chapters in this book, but rather to highlight their personal points of contact with the notion of JDM as a dynamic skill. The following perspectives offer historical accounts, and also point to future lines of research. Shanteau describes how over the years he has highlighted the importance of training and skill acquisition in JDM. Wallsten remembers the benefits of learning for JDM performance found in a study that he conducted 30 years ago. Fischhoff points out that a sound understanding of the normative implications of tasks has laid a better foundation for the study of dynamically changing skills, especially in development. Levin and colleagues provide useful examples of their research on the developmental and neurological bases of JDM skills. Reyna highlights how her fuzzy trace theory taps into JDM processes that develop over time and experience, has neurological correlates, and may be evolutionarily adaptive. Baron reveals how he now finds himself in search of the developmental origins of the types of moral heuristics and biases that he has studied during his career. Hogarth shares three steps he has developed during decades of teaching decision making that can help people make better decisions. Klayman reveals that despite decades of studying learning and development of JDM, he still seeks a greater understanding of how decision makers 'get that way.' Finally, Birnbaum points to the methodological factors that have limited our understanding of JDM as a skill, and presents a challenge for future researchers: to explain how and why JDM skills change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
