Geänderte Inhalte

Humans are causal agents par excellence. But what are the psychological processes that have evolved to produce human causal cognition? And which aspects of causal cognition are uniquely human and which are shared with other species? This chapter describes how a computational model of causal inference, causal model theory, can usefully frame these questions and allow the design of experiments that can Illuminate the underlying psychological competencies. The model specifies procedures that allow organisms to go beyond the information given to distinguish causal from noncausal covariations. By using this model we assume that organisms such as rats and people have evolved to approximate rational causal inference. The chapter discusses experimental Investigations of rat behavior under conditions designed to test the predictions of causal model theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

In conclusion, rather than present a summary of the preceding chapters, nine eminent past presidents of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (SJDM) were invited to provide personal perspectives on the concept of judgment and decision making (JDM) as a dynamic skill. These scholars were not asked to comment on the chapters in this book, but rather to highlight their personal points of contact with the notion of JDM as a dynamic skill. The following perspectives offer historical accounts, and also point to future lines of research. Shanteau describes how over the years he has highlighted the importance of training and skill acquisition in JDM. Wallsten remembers the benefits of learning for JDM performance found in a study that he conducted 30 years ago. Fischhoff points out that a sound understanding of the normative implications of tasks has laid a better foundation for the study of dynamically changing skills, especially in development. Levin and colleagues provide useful examples of their research on the developmental and neurological bases of JDM skills. Reyna highlights how her fuzzy trace theory taps into JDM processes that develop over time and experience, has neurological correlates, and may be evolutionarily adaptive. Baron reveals how he now finds himself in search of the developmental origins of the types of moral heuristics and biases that he has studied during his career. Hogarth shares three steps he has developed during decades of teaching decision making that can help people make better decisions. Klayman reveals that despite decades of studying learning and development of JDM, he still seeks a greater understanding of how decision makers 'get that way.' Finally, Birnbaum points to the methodological factors that have limited our understanding of JDM as a skill, and presents a challenge for future researchers: to explain how and why JDM skills change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Eine experimentelle Anordnung zur Überprüfung der Frage, ob beim Erwerb von Wissen über kausale Zusammenhänge allein assoziative Beziehungen zwischen den Lernereignissen (Assoziationstheorien) gelernt werden oder ob dabei das Wissen über kausale Eigenschaften von Ereignissen, etwa die Gerichtetheit kausaler Beziehungen (Theorie der Kausalmodelle) genutzt wird, wird vorgestellt. Die Überprüfung der beiden konkurrierenden Positionen erfolgt anhand einer klassischen Lernaufgabe aus der Assoziationspsychologie, dem Overshadowing-Paradigma.

Modern technological means allow for meaningful interaction across arbitrary distances, while human morality evolved in environments in which individuals needed to be spatially close in order to interact. We investigate how people integrate knowledge about modern technology with their ancestral moral dispositions to help relieve nearby suffering. Our first study establishes that spatial proximity between an agent's means of helping and the victims increases people's judgement of helping obligations, even if the agent is constantly far personally. We then report and meta-analyse 20 experiments elucidating the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect, which include inferences of increased efficaciousness and personal involvement. Implications of our findings for the scientific understanding of ancestral moral dispositions in modern environments are discussed, as well as suggestions for how these insights might be exploited to increase charitable giving. Our meta-analysis provides a practical example for how aggregating across all available data, including failed replication attempts, allows conclusions that could not be supported in single experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Recently, a number of rational theories have been put forward which provide a coherent formal framework for modeling different types of causal inferences, such as prediction, diagnosis, and action planning. A hallmark of these theories is their capacity to simultaneously express probability distributions under observational and interventional scenarios, thereby rendering it possible to derive precise predictions about interventions ('doing') from passive observations ('seeing'). In Part 1 of the paper we discuss different modeling approaches for formally representing interventions and review the empirical evidence on how humans draw causal inferences based on observations or interventions. We contrast deterministic interventions with imperfect actions yielding unreliable or unknown outcomes. In Part 2, we discuss alternative strategies for making interventional decisions when the causal structure is unknown to the agent. A Bayesian approach of rational causal inference, which aims to infer the structure and its parameters from the available data, provides the benchmark model. This account is contrasted with a heuristic approach which knows categories of causes and effects but neglects further structural information. The results of computer simulations show that despite its computational parsimony the heuristic approach achieves very good performance compared to the Bayesian model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Comments on article by Shira Elqayam and Jonathan St. B. T. Evans (see record [rid]2011-26229-001[/rid]). I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

The past decade has seen a renewed interest in moral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or overlapping phenomena. This review focuses on moral judgments and is written from the perspective of cognitive psychologists interested in theories of the cognitive and affective processes underlying judgments in moral domains. The review will first present and discuss a variety of different theoretical and empirical approaches, including both behavioral and neuroscientific studies. We will then show how these theories can be applied to a selected number of specific research topics that have attracted particular interest in recent years, including the distinction between moral and conventional rules, moral dilemmas, the role of intention, and sacred/protected values. One overarching question we will address throughout the chapter is whether moral cognitions are distinct and special, or whether they can be subsumed under more domain-general mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

According to the standard definition of lying an utterance counts as a lie if the agent believes the statement to be false. Thus, according to this view it is possible that a lie states something that happens to be true. This subjective view on lying has recently been challenged by Turri and Turri (2015) who presented empirical evidence suggesting that people only consider statements as lies that are objectively false (objective view). We argue that the presented evidence is in fact consistent with the standard subjective view if conversational pragmatics is taken into account. Three experiments are presented that directly test and support the subjective view. An additional experiment backs up our pragmatic hypothesis by using the uncontroversial case of making a promise. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Es wird ein exemplarischer Überblick zur aktuellen Forschung im Bereich der differentiellen Kognitionspsychologie gegeben. Dabei werden Erkenntnisse aus drei verschiedenen Forschungsparadigmen berücksichtigt: (1) Der Ansatz der kognitiven Komponenten bezieht sich auf interindividuelle Unterschiede in den Denkprozessen, die bei der Bearbeitung von Intelligenzaufgaben eingesetzt werden (beispielhaft Arbeiten zum induktiven und bildhaften Denken). (2) Der Ansatz der kognitiven Korrelate konzentriert sich auf allgemeine Eigenschaften der kognitiven Architektur und sucht nach interindividuellen Unterschieden, die im Hinblick auf die Struktur und Entwicklung von Intelligenzleistungen relevant sind (Kurzzeitgedächtnis, Wissensabruf, Lernen, Metakognitionen, Umgang mit neuartigen Informationen). (3) Die Expertiseforschung befasst sich mit dem Denken von Experten in komplexen Kontexten.

Ausgehend von den philosophischen Ansätzen von Heraklit, Demokrit, Aristoteles, David Hume, Immanuel Kant und neueren bedingungsanalytischen (J. L. Mackie), kontrafaktischen (D. Lewis), handlungstheoretischen (G. von Wright) und probabilistischen Modellen zur Kausalität werden folgende psychologischen Theorien kausalen Denkens und Lernens sowie Befunde zu ihrer empirischen Evidenz skizziert: (1) Assoziationstheorien (etwa Lernregel der Rescorla-Wagner-Theorie und ihre Weiterentwicklungen), (2) regelbasierte Ansätze (varianzanalytischer und kontingenztheoretischer Absatz, probabilistisches Kontrast-Modell, Theorie der Kausalen Power, Theorie der Evidenzevaluation), (3) deduktiver Ansatz, (4) mechanistischer Ansatz, (5) urteilstheoretischer Ansatz, (6) Kausalmodelle und Bayes-Netze. Insgesamt zeigt sich eine enge Verbindung zwischen den philosophischen und psychologischen Theorien.

This book presents a comprehensive review of emerging theories and research on the dynamic nature of human judgment and decision making (JDM). Leading researchers in the fields of JDM, cognitive development, human learning, and neuroscience discuss short-term and long-term changes in JDM skills. The authors consider how such skills increase and decline on a developmental scale in children, adolescents, and the elderly; how they may be learned; and how JDM skills can be improved and aided. In addition, beyond these behavioral approaches to understanding JDM as a skill, the book provides new insights from recent evolutionary and neuropsychological approaches. The authors identify opportunities for future research on the acquisition and changing nature of JDM. In a concluding chapter, eminent past presidents of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making provide personal reflections and perspectives on the notion of JDM as a dynamic skill. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

This special section brings together behavioral, computational, mathematical, and neuroimaging approaches to understand the processes underlying category learning. Over the past decade, there has been growing convergence in research on categorization, with computational–mathematical models influencing the interpretation of brain imaging and neuropsychological data, and with cognitive neuroscience findings influencing the development and refinement of models. Classic debates between single-system and multiple-memory-system theories have become more nuanced and focused. Multiple brain areas and cognitive processes contribute to categorization, but theories differ markedly in whether and when those neurocognitive components are recruited for different aspects of categorization. The articles in this special section approach this issue from several diverse angles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Nach einer knappen Darstellung und Kritik der psychometrischen Intelligenzforschung werden Theorien und Befunde der differentiellen Kognitionsforschung zur Struktur, zum Prozess und zur Entwicklung des induktiven, deduktiven und bildhaften Denkens im Überblick dargestellt. Im Vordergrund stehen dabei die kognitive Entwicklung Hochbegabter, Analysen herausragender Problemlöseleistungen und Möglichkeiten für eine pädagogische Förderung hochbegabter Kinder und Jugendlicher. - Aus dem Inhaltsverzeichnis: (1) Von der psychometrischen Hochbegabtenforschung zur differentialpsychologischen Analyse des Denkens. (2) Kognitive Komponenten der Intelligenz \\\\#422Induktives Denken; deduktives Denken; bildhaftes Denken\\\\#423. (3) Die kognitive Entwicklung Hochbegabter \\\\#422Piaget-orientierte Ansätze; Informationsverarbeitungsansätze\\\\#423. (4) Intellektuelle Hochleistungen in komplexen Inhaltsbereichen \\\\#422Komplexes Problemlösen; Expertenleistungen beim Schach und Programmieren sowie bei physikalischen, sozialwissenschaftlichen und medizinischen Problemen\\\\#423. (5) Perspektiven der Hochbegabtenforschung und Ansätze für eine pragmatische Hochbegabtenförderung.

The question how agent and patient roles are assigned to causal participants has largely been neglected in the psychological literature on force dynamics. Inspired by the linguistic theory of Dowty (1991), we propose that agency attributions are based on a prototype concept of human intervention. We predicted that the number of criteria a participant in a causal interaction shares with this prototype determines the strength of agency intuitions. We showed in two experiments using versions of Michotteʼs (1963) launching scenarios that agency intuitions were moderated by manipulations of the context prior to the launching event. Altering features, such as relative movement, sequence of visibility, and self-propelled motion, tended to increase agency attributions to the participant that is normally viewed as patient in the standard scenario. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Ausgewählte erste Ergebnisse aus der Zwillingslängsschnittstudie ``Genetisch orientierte Lebensspannenstudie zur differentiellen Entwicklung'' (GOLD) werden mitgeteilt, die sich mit der Frage des impliziten versus expliziten Lernens im Alter beschäftigen. Die vorgestellten Befunde beziehen sich auf eine Stichprobe von 199 ein- und zweieiigen Zwilligen im Alter zwischen 63 und 81 Jahren. In Bezug auf das explizite Lernen fanden sich keine Belege für einen genetischen Einfluss. Es ergaben sich Hinweise darauf, dass die allgemeine Reaktionszeit eine Persönlichkeitseigenschaft darstellt, die stark vom Intelligenzquotienten abhängt und die auch eine starke genetische Kompenente beinhaltet. Hingegen erwies sich die implizite Lernkomponente als altersinvariant und nur in geringem Maße interindividuell stabil.

Recent experimental findings suggest that prescriptive norms influence causal inferences. The cognitive mechanism underlying this finding is still under debate. We compare three competing theories: The culpable control model of blame argues that reasoners tend to exaggerate the causal influence of norm-violating agents, which should lead to relatively higher causal strength estimates for these agents. By contrast, the counterfactual reasoning account of causal selection assumes that norms do not alter the representation of the causal model, but rather later causal selection stages. According to this view, reasoners tend to preferentially consider counterfactual states of abnormal rather than normal factors, which leads to the choice of the abnormal factor in a causal selection task. A third view, the accountability hypothesis, claims that the effects of prescriptive norms are generated by the ambiguity of the causal test question. Asking whether an agent is a cause can be understood as a request to assess her causal contribution but also her moral accountability. According to this theory norm effects on causal selection are mediated by accountability judgments that are not only sensitive to the abnormality of behavior but also to mitigating factors, such as intentionality and knowledge of norms. Five experiments are presented that favor the accountability account over the two alternative theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

The standard approach guiding research on the relationship between categories and causality views categories as reflecting causal relations in the world. In the present study evidence is provided that the opposite direction also holds: Categories that have been acquired in previous learning contexts may influence subsequent causal learning. In three experiments with a total of 128 participants it is shown that identical causal learning experiences yield different attributions of causal capacity depending on the pre-existing categories that the learning exemplars are assigned to. There is a strong tendency to continue to use old conceptual schemes rather than switch to new ones even when the old categories are not optimal for predicting the new effect. This tendency is particularly strong when there is a plausible semantic link between the categories and the new causal hypothesis under investigation.

States that current experimental research does not fully exploit the heuristic power of psychological theories of action. The paucity of experimental research guided by action-theoretical approaches is partly attributed to the impact of several metatheoretical positions according to which many elements of action theories are not amenable to experimental testing. Four theories of action are discussed, and experimental research suggested by each of these approaches is illustrated. Typical problems arising when complex theories are tested empirically are also considered. (English abstract) (4 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)