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Research on human causal induction has shown that people have general prior assumptions about causal strength and about how causes interact with the background. We propose that these prior assumptions about the parameters of causal systems do not only manifest themselves in estimations of causal strength or the selection of causes but also when deciding between alternative causal structures. In three experiments, we requested subjects to choose which of two observable variables was the cause and which the effect. We found strong evidence that learners have interindividually variable but intraindividually stable priors about causal parameters that express a preference for causal determinism (sufficiency or necessity; Experiment 1). These priors predict which structure subjects preferentially select. The priors can be manipulated experimentally (Experiment 2) and appear to be domain−general (Experiment 3). Heuristic strategies of structure induction are suggested that can be viewed as simplified implementations of the priors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

Our research examines the normative and descriptive adequacy of alternative computational models of diagnostic reasoning from single effects to single causes. Many theories of diagnostic reasoning are based on the normative assumption that inferences from an effect to its cause should reflect solely the empirically observed conditional probability of cause given effect. We argue against this assumption, as it neglects alternative causal structures that may have generated the sample data. Our structure induction model of diagnostic reasoning takes into account the uncertainty regarding the underlying causal structure. A key prediction of the model is that diagnostic judgments should not only reflect the empirical probability of cause given effect but should also depend on the reasonerʼs beliefs about the existence and strength of the link between cause and effect. We confirmed this prediction in 2 studies and showed that our theory better accounts for human judgments than alternative theories of diagnostic reasoning. Overall, our findings support the view that in diagnostic reasoning people go 'beyond the information given' and use the available data to make inferences on the (unobserved) causal rather than on the (observed) data level. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

In the present research we analyze the interrelations of spatial distance and efficaciousness in helping needy others, and we investigate how these factors affect our judgments of moral helping obligations. The main question is under which conditions the location of an agent's means of helping relative to a victim is regarded as morally relevant. We develop a new experimental design that allows us to test our hypotheses concurrently in both separate and joint evaluation modes using a constant procedure across groups. We find that spatial proximity of an agent's means to a victim increases people's sense of obligation only to the extent to which it is indicative of increased efficaciousness or personal involvement.

The ability to derive predictions for the outcomes of potential actions from observational data is one of the hallmarks of true causal reasoning. We present four learning experiments with deterministic and probabilistic data showing that people indeed make different predictions from causal models, whose parameters were learned in a purely observational learning phase, depending on whether learners believe that an event within the model has been merely observed ('seeing') or was actively manipulated ('doing'). The predictions reflect sensitivity both to the structure of the causal models and to the size of their parameters. This competency is remarkable because the predictions for potential interventions were very different from the patterns that had actually been observed. Whereas associative and probabilistic theories fail, recent developments of causal Bayes net theories provide tools for modeling this competency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Das Zusammenwirken von Raum- und Ereignisschemata beim Erinnern von Alltagssituationen wird in einer Reihe von sechs Experimenten analysiert. Die Experimente wurden an insgesamt 424 studentischen Versuchspersonen durchgeführt. In den Experimenten wurden komplexe Räume gezeigt, die in jeweils zwei unabhängigen Bedingungen mit zwei unterschiedlichen Aktivitätstypen gepaart wurden. Wesentliche Ergebnisse waren: (1) Die nicht in Handlungen verwickelten Objekte hatten einen robusten Raumschemaeffekt. (2) Handlungsobjekte wurden generell gut erinnert. (3) Mit zunehmendem Behaltensintervall wurde die Gedächtnisleistung beim freien Erinnern schlechter. (4) Neben klar schemaabhängigen Handlungsintrusionen zeigten sich auch Intrusionen, die auf ein allgemeines Wohnraumschema zurückzuführen waren. (5) Auch die Befunde zum visuellen Wiedererkennen lieferten klare Hinweise auf Schemanutzungsprozesse. Aus den Befunden werden Konsequenzen für die zukünftige schematheoretische Forschung abgeleitet.

We argue that conceptual problems arise with the parametric measure β when above- and below-chance data are aggregated or compared. Depending on the interpretation of β as a likelihood-ratio measure or an indicator of strictness or bias toward signal or noise, the original formula for β should be retained or modified. The response bias measure β can be retained only if it is interpreted as a likelihood-ratio measure. If it is interpreted as an indicator of strictness or bias toward signal or noise, the original formula has to be modified. One possible modified formula is suggested here. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

In two experiments, rats received sensory preconditioning treatment in which an auditory conditioned stimulus (CS) X was followed by visual CS A in Phase 1, and CS A was followed by an appetitive US (sucrose) in Phase 2. Rats also received presentations of auditory CS Y unpaired with other events. At test, rats looked for sucrose more following CS X than following CS Y on non-reinforced probe test trials only if the light bulb on which CS A had been presented during training was removed from the chamber at the time of testing. With the light bulb present (but unlit), rats showed no difference in amount of nose poking between CS X and CS Y. These results suggest that rats distinguish between the explicit absence of events and lack of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two experiments, rats received sensory preconditioning treatment in which an auditory conditioned stimulus (CS) X was followed by visual CS A in Phase 1, and CS A was followed by an appetitive US (sucrose) in Phase 2. Rats also received presentations of auditory CS Y unpaired with other events. At test, rats looked for sucrose more following CS X than following CS Y on non-reinforced probe test trials only if the light bulb on which CS A had been presented during training was removed from the chamber at the time of testing. With the light bulb present (but unlit), rats showed no difference in amount of nose poking between CS X and CS Y. These results suggest that rats distinguish between the explicit absence of events and lack of information

The goal of three experiments was to study whether rats are aware of the difference between absence of events and lack of evidence. We used a Pavlovian extinction paradigm in which lights consistently signaling sucrose were suddenly paired with the absence of sucrose. The crucial manipulation involved the absent outcomes in the extinction phase. Whereas in the Cover conditions, access to the drinking receptacle was blocked by a metal plate, in the No Cover conditions, the drinking receptacle was accessible. The Test phase showed that in the Cover conditions, the measured expectancies of sucrose were clearly at a higher level than in the No Cover conditions. We compare two competing theories potentially explaining the findings. A cognitive theory interprets the observed effect as evidence that the rats were able to understand that the cover blocked informational access to the outcome information, and therefore the changed learning input did not necessarily signify a change of the underlying contingency in the world. An alternative associationist account, renewal theory, might instead explain the relative sparing of extinction in the Cover condition as a consequence of context change. We discuss the merits of both theories as accounts of our data and conclude that the cognitive explanation is in this case preferred. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Humans are causal agents par excellence. But what are the psychological processes that have evolved to produce human causal cognition? And which aspects of causal cognition are uniquely human and which are shared with other species? This chapter describes how a computational model of causal inference, causal model theory, can usefully frame these questions and allow the design of experiments that can Illuminate the underlying psychological competencies. The model specifies procedures that allow organisms to go beyond the information given to distinguish causal from noncausal covariations. By using this model we assume that organisms such as rats and people have evolved to approximate rational causal inference. The chapter discusses experimental Investigations of rat behavior under conditions designed to test the predictions of causal model theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

In conclusion, rather than present a summary of the preceding chapters, nine eminent past presidents of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (SJDM) were invited to provide personal perspectives on the concept of judgment and decision making (JDM) as a dynamic skill. These scholars were not asked to comment on the chapters in this book, but rather to highlight their personal points of contact with the notion of JDM as a dynamic skill. The following perspectives offer historical accounts, and also point to future lines of research. Shanteau describes how over the years he has highlighted the importance of training and skill acquisition in JDM. Wallsten remembers the benefits of learning for JDM performance found in a study that he conducted 30 years ago. Fischhoff points out that a sound understanding of the normative implications of tasks has laid a better foundation for the study of dynamically changing skills, especially in development. Levin and colleagues provide useful examples of their research on the developmental and neurological bases of JDM skills. Reyna highlights how her fuzzy trace theory taps into JDM processes that develop over time and experience, has neurological correlates, and may be evolutionarily adaptive. Baron reveals how he now finds himself in search of the developmental origins of the types of moral heuristics and biases that he has studied during his career. Hogarth shares three steps he has developed during decades of teaching decision making that can help people make better decisions. Klayman reveals that despite decades of studying learning and development of JDM, he still seeks a greater understanding of how decision makers 'get that way.' Finally, Birnbaum points to the methodological factors that have limited our understanding of JDM as a skill, and presents a challenge for future researchers: to explain how and why JDM skills change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Eine experimentelle Anordnung zur Überprüfung der Frage, ob beim Erwerb von Wissen über kausale Zusammenhänge allein assoziative Beziehungen zwischen den Lernereignissen (Assoziationstheorien) gelernt werden oder ob dabei das Wissen über kausale Eigenschaften von Ereignissen, etwa die Gerichtetheit kausaler Beziehungen (Theorie der Kausalmodelle) genutzt wird, wird vorgestellt. Die Überprüfung der beiden konkurrierenden Positionen erfolgt anhand einer klassischen Lernaufgabe aus der Assoziationspsychologie, dem Overshadowing-Paradigma.

Modern technological means allow for meaningful interaction across arbitrary distances, while human morality evolved in environments in which individuals needed to be spatially close in order to interact. We investigate how people integrate knowledge about modern technology with their ancestral moral dispositions to help relieve nearby suffering. Our first study establishes that spatial proximity between an agent's means of helping and the victims increases people's judgement of helping obligations, even if the agent is constantly far personally. We then report and meta-analyse 20 experiments elucidating the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect, which include inferences of increased efficaciousness and personal involvement. Implications of our findings for the scientific understanding of ancestral moral dispositions in modern environments are discussed, as well as suggestions for how these insights might be exploited to increase charitable giving. Our meta-analysis provides a practical example for how aggregating across all available data, including failed replication attempts, allows conclusions that could not be supported in single experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Recently, a number of rational theories have been put forward which provide a coherent formal framework for modeling different types of causal inferences, such as prediction, diagnosis, and action planning. A hallmark of these theories is their capacity to simultaneously express probability distributions under observational and interventional scenarios, thereby rendering it possible to derive precise predictions about interventions ('doing') from passive observations ('seeing'). In Part 1 of the paper we discuss different modeling approaches for formally representing interventions and review the empirical evidence on how humans draw causal inferences based on observations or interventions. We contrast deterministic interventions with imperfect actions yielding unreliable or unknown outcomes. In Part 2, we discuss alternative strategies for making interventional decisions when the causal structure is unknown to the agent. A Bayesian approach of rational causal inference, which aims to infer the structure and its parameters from the available data, provides the benchmark model. This account is contrasted with a heuristic approach which knows categories of causes and effects but neglects further structural information. The results of computer simulations show that despite its computational parsimony the heuristic approach achieves very good performance compared to the Bayesian model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Comments on article by Shira Elqayam and Jonathan St. B. T. Evans (see record [rid]2011-26229-001[/rid]). I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

The past decade has seen a renewed interest in moral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or overlapping phenomena. This review focuses on moral judgments and is written from the perspective of cognitive psychologists interested in theories of the cognitive and affective processes underlying judgments in moral domains. The review will first present and discuss a variety of different theoretical and empirical approaches, including both behavioral and neuroscientific studies. We will then show how these theories can be applied to a selected number of specific research topics that have attracted particular interest in recent years, including the distinction between moral and conventional rules, moral dilemmas, the role of intention, and sacred/protected values. One overarching question we will address throughout the chapter is whether moral cognitions are distinct and special, or whether they can be subsumed under more domain-general mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

According to the standard definition of lying an utterance counts as a lie if the agent believes the statement to be false. Thus, according to this view it is possible that a lie states something that happens to be true. This subjective view on lying has recently been challenged by Turri and Turri (2015) who presented empirical evidence suggesting that people only consider statements as lies that are objectively false (objective view). We argue that the presented evidence is in fact consistent with the standard subjective view if conversational pragmatics is taken into account. Three experiments are presented that directly test and support the subjective view. An additional experiment backs up our pragmatic hypothesis by using the uncontroversial case of making a promise. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Es wird ein exemplarischer Überblick zur aktuellen Forschung im Bereich der differentiellen Kognitionspsychologie gegeben. Dabei werden Erkenntnisse aus drei verschiedenen Forschungsparadigmen berücksichtigt: (1) Der Ansatz der kognitiven Komponenten bezieht sich auf interindividuelle Unterschiede in den Denkprozessen, die bei der Bearbeitung von Intelligenzaufgaben eingesetzt werden (beispielhaft Arbeiten zum induktiven und bildhaften Denken). (2) Der Ansatz der kognitiven Korrelate konzentriert sich auf allgemeine Eigenschaften der kognitiven Architektur und sucht nach interindividuellen Unterschieden, die im Hinblick auf die Struktur und Entwicklung von Intelligenzleistungen relevant sind (Kurzzeitgedächtnis, Wissensabruf, Lernen, Metakognitionen, Umgang mit neuartigen Informationen). (3) Die Expertiseforschung befasst sich mit dem Denken von Experten in komplexen Kontexten.

Ausgehend von den philosophischen Ansätzen von Heraklit, Demokrit, Aristoteles, David Hume, Immanuel Kant und neueren bedingungsanalytischen (J. L. Mackie), kontrafaktischen (D. Lewis), handlungstheoretischen (G. von Wright) und probabilistischen Modellen zur Kausalität werden folgende psychologischen Theorien kausalen Denkens und Lernens sowie Befunde zu ihrer empirischen Evidenz skizziert: (1) Assoziationstheorien (etwa Lernregel der Rescorla-Wagner-Theorie und ihre Weiterentwicklungen), (2) regelbasierte Ansätze (varianzanalytischer und kontingenztheoretischer Absatz, probabilistisches Kontrast-Modell, Theorie der Kausalen Power, Theorie der Evidenzevaluation), (3) deduktiver Ansatz, (4) mechanistischer Ansatz, (5) urteilstheoretischer Ansatz, (6) Kausalmodelle und Bayes-Netze. Insgesamt zeigt sich eine enge Verbindung zwischen den philosophischen und psychologischen Theorien.