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Objectives Although sports team members often value their teams highly, they sometimes make mistakes and thereby unintentionally put their teams at a disadvantage. Thus, they should be motivated to compensate for their mistake to resolve this discrepancy. To test this hypothesis, we studied whether professional soccer players compensate for their own goals by scoring regular goals in the same game (Study 1) and possible processes underlying such compensation efforts (Study 2). Design In Study 1, we compared how frequently prior own goal scorers scored a regular goal in the same game to (a) their expected goal scoring frequencies and (b) their probabilities to score a regular goal following a regular goal by the opposing team. In Study 2, we investigated four possible processes underlying the expected compensatory efforts. Method We analyzed all own goals from the first fifty years of the German Bundesliga (N = 889) and possible ensuing regular goals by the own goal scorer. Moreover, we surveyed amateur soccer players about four motives: group performance, individual performance, individual public image, and group public image. Results Following their own goals, professional soccer players are particularly likely to score regular goals in the same game (i.e., a compensatory own goal effect). Presumably, they primarily do so to secure a good group performance, but the other motives also play a role. Conclusions Group members who make highly visible mistakes are motivated to compensate for the disadvantage they caused. Presumably, they mainly do so to secure a good team Performance.
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Research has shown that people prefer supporting to conflicting information when making decisions. Whether this biased information search also occurs in group decision making was examined in three experiments. Experiment 1 indicated that groups as well as individuals prefer supporting information and that the strength of this bias depends on the distribution of the group members' initial decision preferences. The more group members had chosen the same alternative prior to the group discussion (group homogeneity), the more strongly the group preferred information supporting that alternative. Experiment 2 replicated these results with managers. Experiment 3 showed that the differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups reflect group-level processes. Higher commitment and confidence in homogeneous groups mediated this effect. Functional and dysfunctional aspects of biased information seeking in group decision making are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or personalized support, differing from country to country. However, little is known about how these different instruments and taxpayers’ trust influence the generation of interaction climates between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply, and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes tax authorities’ instruments into different qualities of power of authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reason-based and implicit), to shed light on the effect of differences between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey data from taxpayers from three culturally different countries ( N = 700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust, interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit trust. The connection from legitimate power to tax compliance is partially mediated by reason-based trust. The relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is mediated by a confidence climate and committed cooperation. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. Full Article Figures & data References Citations Metrics Licensing PDF ABSTRACT Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or personalized support, differing from country to country. However, little is known about how these different instruments and taxpayers’ trust influence the generation of interaction climates between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply, and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes tax authorities’ instruments into different qualities of power of authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reason-based and implicit), to shed light on the effect of differences between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey data from taxpayers from three culturally different countries (N = 700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust, interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit trust. The connection from legitimate power to tax compliance is partially mediated by reason-based trust. The relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is mediated by a confidence climate and committed cooperation. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. ABSTRACT Introduction Method Results Discussion References Full Article Figures & data References Citations Metrics Licensing PDF ABSTRACT Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or personalized support, differing from country to country. However, little is known about how these different instruments and taxpayers’ trust influence the generation of interaction climates between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply, and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes tax authorities’ instruments into different qualities of power of authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reason-based and implicit), to shed light on the effect of differences between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey data from taxpayers from three culturally different countries (N = 700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust, interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit trust. The connection from legitimate power to tax compliance is partially mediated by reason-based trust. The relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is mediated by a confidence climate and committed cooperation. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
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Tax honesty means to give up short-term self-interest for the good of the community. States need sufficient tax funds to finance public goods such as health care or education. Tax psychology has the aim to understand citizens’ tax behaviour and to analyse the psychological processes, which determine tax honesty. The present book chapter gives an overview of the history of taxation, the different qualities of tax behaviour, the socio-demographic, economic, psychological, third party and cultural determinants of tax compliance as well as the theoretical models of tax behaviour. Throughout the chapter, research gaps and future research avenues are descripted. In addition, the most important general guide rails for future tax research are discussed in the conclusion including the analyses of interactions between tax compliance determinants, the application of new methods such as field-experiments applying machine learning, the boundary conditions and consequences of digitalization and research on tax behaviour in developing and emerging markets.
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A constructive, highly professional relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers is essential for tax compliance. The aim of the present paper was to explore systematically the determinants of this relationship and related tax compliance behaviors based on the extended slippery slope framework. We used in-depth qualitative interviews with 33 self-employed taxpayers and 30 tax auditors. Interviewees described the relationship along the extended slippery slope framework concepts of power and trust. However, also novel sub-categories of power (e.g., setting deadlines) and trust (e.g., personal assistance) were mentioned. Furthermore, also little-studied categories of tax behavior emerged, such as accepting tax behavior, e.g., being available to the tax authorities, or stalling tax behavior, e.g., the intentional creation of complexity. The results comprehensively summarize the determinants of the tax relationship and tax compliance behaviors. Additionally, results highlight future research topics and provide insights for policy strategies.
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Economic psychology studies the fundamentals of perception and understanding of economic phenomena, economic thought and behaviour. It is an interdisciplinary field of research, strongly overlapping with behavioural economics. Scholars in the field laid the foundations more than a century ago, studying work and organizational behaviour, consumer decision making and selected topics of public economics. Today, economic psychology deals with cognitive dynamics and decision making in general, lay theories of economics, marketing and consumer behaviour, household financial decisions, labour markets, entrepreneurship, work and unemployment, shadow economy and tax behaviour, and wealth and wellbeing. Focusing on the cognitive drivers of decision making, economic psychology also considers emotions related to economic behaviour, such as greed and envy, fear and anger, and positive feelings, such as satisfaction and well-being. We have selected contributions to these topics and provide in the introduction a short overview of the history of economic psychology. The selected papers are briefly introduced, emphasizing future directions of research and potential contributions to contemporary societal challenges.
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Misconduct in organizations (such as fraud, stealing, deception, and harming others) is not only a matter of some “bad apples” but also related to the organizational context (“bad barrels”), which can facilitate either ethical or unethical behaviors. Given the financial crisis and recurring corporate ethics scandals, policymakers, regulators and organizations are interested in how to change their organizational cultures to enhance ethical behavior and to prevent further disasters. For this purpose, organizations need to better understand what strategies and factors of the organizational environment can affect (un)ethical behavior. However, to assess the corporate ethical culture, solid measures are required. Since there is an urgent need to have a German measure to promote research in German-speaking countries, this research developed and tested the German Ethical Culture Scale (GECS). Drawing on a prominent approach that has received much attention from scholars and practitioners alike, the GECS attempts to integrate the notion of compliance- and integrity-based ethics programs (with its focus on how to steer organizations) with the notion of ethical culture (with its focus on what factors inhibit or foster ethical behavior). Three studies with heterogeneous samples of German and Swiss employees and managers were conducted to develop, test and validate the multidimensional scale (total N > 2000). Overall, the studies provide first evidence of the measure’s construct, criteria-related and incremental validity. The paper concludes with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the GECS and implications for future research.
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This book presents state of the art reviews on classical and novel research fields in economic psychology. Internationally acknowledged experts and the next generation of younger researchers summarize the knowledge in their fields and outline promising avenues of future research. Chapters include fundamental as well as applied research topics such as the psychology of money, experience-based product design and the enhancement of financial capabilities. The book is targeted particularly towards researchers and advanced students looking to update their knowledge and refresh their thinking on future research developments.
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Carver and Scheier’s (1990) account of goal striving predicts that unexpectedly fast goal progress leads to reduced effort at that goal (coasting) and to shifting focus toward other goals (shifting). Although these hypotheses are key to this goal-striving account, empirical evidence of coasting and shifting is scarce. Here we demonstrate coasting and shifting in two experiments: Participants performed a lexical decision task and were promised a bonus if they delivered a specific number of correct responses (accuracy goal) and a specific number of fast responses (speed goal). After half of the trials, participants received (randomly allocated) feedback on their progress regarding the two goals, in which progress toward one goal was either above or below the target. In line with hypotheses, better-than-needed progress toward one goal led to (a) reduced subsequent progress toward that goal (as reflected in lower goal-related performance; coasting) and (b) a shift of resources toward the alternative goal (as reflected in higher goal-related performance on the alternative goal; shifting). Experiment 1 further demonstrated that positive feedback led to positive affect, and Experiment 2 demonstrated the causal role of affect in coasting and shifting. The implications of the present findings for future research on goal striving are discussed.
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Abstract People are motivated to process threatening information in a defensive manner. For instance, in self-reports, group members consistently reject threatening outgroup criticism compared with the same criticism from the ingroup (intergroup sensitivity effect). Because self-reports are a poor proxy for actual behavior, it remains unknown whether this defensiveness motivates hostile actions. We fill this gap in the literature: Five experiments (total N = 787) show that group members pay to punish critical outgroup comments, exclude outgroup commenters from a subject pool, and reject ultimatum bargaining offers from outgroup commenters compared with ingroup commenters voicing the same criticism. These defensive behaviors represent hostile actions and are robust in a meta-analysis across our 5 studies. Intergroup sensitivity thus motivates hostile defensive actions. We discuss potential consequences for intergroup relations.
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Successful sprint starts require self-control: Athletes need to avoid a false start (impulse control) and at the same time need to start as fast as possible (action initiation). Research from cognitive neuroscience shows that such self-control acts hinge on activity in areas in the lateral Prefrontal Cortex (lPFC). We are harnessing these findings in order to accurately analyze and better understand the neural basis of self-controlled sprint start Performance.
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The execution of coercive and legitimate power by an authority assures cooperation and prohibits free-riding. While coercive power can be comprised of severe punishment and strict monitoring, legitimate power covers expert, and informative procedures. The perception of these powers wielded by authorities stimulates specific cognitions: trust, relational climates, and motives. With four experiments, the single and combined impact of coercive and legitimate power on these processes and on intended cooperation of n 1 = 120, n 2 = 130, n 3 = 368, and n 4 = 102 student participants is investigated within two exemplary contexts (tax contributions, insurance claims). Findings reveal that coercive power increases an antagonistic climate and enforced compliance, whereas legitimate power increases reason-based trust, a service climate, and voluntary cooperation. Unexpectedly, legitimate power is additionally having a negative effect on an antagonistic climate and a positive effect on enforced compliance; these findings lead to a modification of theoretical assumptions. However, solely reason-based trust, but not climate perceptions and motives, mediates the relationship between power and intended cooperation. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
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Cooperation in social systems such as tax honesty is of central importance in our modern societies. However, we know little about cognitive and neural processes driving decisions to evade or pay taxes. This study focuses on the impact of perceived tax authority and examines the mental chronometry mirrored in ERP data allowing a deeper understanding about why humans cooperate in tax systems. We experimentally manipulated coercive and legitimate authority and studied its impact on cooperation and underlying cognitive (experiment 1, 2) and neuronal (experiment 2) processes. Experiment 1 showed that in a condition of coercive authority, tax payments are lower, decisions are faster and participants report more rational reasoning and enforced compliance, however, less voluntary cooperation than in a condition of legitimate authority. Experiment 2 confirmed most results, but did not find a difference in payments or self-reported rational reasoning. Moreover, legitimate authority led to heightened cognitive control (expressed by increased MFN amplitudes) and disrupted attention processing (expressed by decreased P300 amplitudes) compared to coercive authority. To conclude, the neuronal data surprisingly revealed that legitimate authority may led to higher decision conflict and thus to higher cognitive demands in tax decisions than coercive authority.
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Considering advice from others is a pervasive element of human social life. We used the judge-advisor paradigm to investigate the neural correlates of advice evaluation and advice integration by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging. Our results demonstrate that evaluating advice recruits the "mentalizing network," brain regions activated when people think about others' mental states. Important activation differences exist, however, depending upon the perceived competence of the advisor. Consistently, additional analyses demonstrate that integrating others' advice, i.e., how much participants actually adjust their initial estimate, correlates with neural activity in the centromedial amygdala in the case of a competent and with activity in visual cortex in the case of an incompetent advisor. Taken together, our findings, therefore, demonstrate that advice evaluation and integration rely on dissociable neural mechanisms and that significant differences exist depending upon the advisor's reputation, which suggests different modes of processing advice depending upon the perceived competence of the advisor.
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Notwithstanding the appeal of the “one size fits all” approach that Baumeister et al. propose, we argue that there is no panacea for improving group performance. The concept of “differentiation of selves” constitutes an umbrella term for similar seeming but actually different constructs. Even the same type of “differentiation of selves” can be beneficial for some and harmful for other tasks.
