Geänderte Inhalte

Anhand einer experimentellen Studie zum Sunk-Cost-Effekt mit Experten wurde der Einfluss versunkener monetärer und zeitlicher Kosten auf Ressourcenallokationen untersucht. Entscheidungen sollten gemäß des ökonomischen Postulats ausschließlich aufgrund der Abwägung von zukünftigen Kosten und Nutzen getroffen werden. Dagegen beschreibt der Sunk-Cost-Effekt das Phänomen, dass auch vergangene Investitionen Entscheidungen beeinflussen. In der vorliegenden Studie wurde der Sunk-Cost-Effekt bei vergangenen monetären Aufwendungen repliziert. Zudem konnte erstmals auch ein Sunk-Cost-Effekt bei zeitlichen Aufwendungen nachgewiesen werden. Bankangestellte (120 Teilnehmer bei der Hauptstichprobe, 24 Teilnehmer bei der Kontrollgruppe) hatten bei insgesamt vier Entscheidungsszenarien die Wahl zwischen zwei Alternativen. Eine der Alternativen wurde jeweils gegenüber der anderen als eindeutig ökonomisch vorteilhafter dargestellt. In die ungünstigere Alternative wurden entweder monetäre oder zeitliche Mittel investiert, wogegen für die objektiv bessere Alternative keine bisherigen Investitionen getätigt worden waren. Die Mehrzahl der Befragten entschied sich in mehreren Fällen für die objektiv schlechtere Alternative, ließ sich also von den bereits erfolgten Aufwendungen leiten. Lediglich im Aktienszenario entschied sich die große Mehrheit der Probanden für die rationale Alternative. Es wird daher als möglich angesehen, dass Experten nur in Situationen, in denen sie ihre Expertise direkt anwenden können, seltener als Laien dem Sunk-Cost-Effekt unterliegen und ein ähnliches irrationales Entscheidungsverhalten zeigen.

Research on selective exposure to information consistently shows that, after having made a decision, people prefer supporting over conflicting information. However, in all of these experiments participants were given an overview of all available pieces of information, selected them simultaneously, and did not process the requested information during the selection phase. In the present research the authors show that an even stronger preference for supporting information arises if information is presented and processed sequentially instead of simultaneously (Experiment 1), and they demonstrate that this stronger confirmation bias is due to sequential presentation and not to sequential processing of information (Experiment 2). The authors provide evidence that the increase in confirmation bias under sequential presentation is caused by heightened commitment due to the participants' increased focusing on their decision (Experiments 3 and 4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses research on the confirmation bias and other selectivity effects in group information seeking, and explores the impact on group decision making. After a short discussion of factors that increase confirmation bias in individual decision making, information seeking processes in groups are described based on the authors' research with groups of two to seven subjects. Results revealed that a confirmation bias (1) occurs after preliminary group decisions, (2) is stronger in groups with homogeneous preferences (further increased by commitment and confidence), (3) is decreased by contrived dissent (i.e., devil's advocacy), though to a lesser degree than by genuine dissent (heterogeneous preferences), (4) does not, as expected, preclude sensitivity to the situational context, (5) increases under justification pressure, but only when the decision may prove objectively wrong, (6) is stronger in groups with a directive leader, and (7) is stronger when the decision is made by an elected group representative. Furthermore, implications of the above findings for ``real world'' group decision making are discussed and measures to increase reality testing in groups are derived.

There is conclusive evidence that information search processes are typically biased in favor of the information seeker's own opinion (confirmation bias). Less is known about how knowledge about others' opinions affects this confirmatory information search. In the present study, the authors manipulated feedback about others' opinions and anticipation of group interaction. As predicted, the effect of knowledge about others' opinions on confirmatory information search depended on whether participants anticipated interacting with these others. Specifically, minority members anticipating a group discussion exhibited a particularly strong confirmation bias, whereas minority members who did not anticipate a discussion predominantly sought information opposing their opinion. For participants not anticipating group interaction, confidence about the correctness of one's decision mediated the impact of knowledge about others' opinions on confirmatory information search. Results are discussed with regard to the debiasing effect of preference heterogeneity on confirmatory information search in groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a comprehensive overview of theoretical and empirical research on biased information seeking in decision-making. A conceptual framework is discussed that draws on the cognitive dissonance theory and the multiple-motive heuristic systematic model. Reviewed studies on defense motivation focus on preferences for supporting versus conflicting information, the effects of commitment and decision salience on information search, differences between sequential versus simultaneous information seeking, and differences between decision and information focus. Studies on impression motivation and accuracy motivation have also differentiated between preferences for supporting versus conflicting information, but have also examined the role of accountability for decision outcomes, the influence of experienced failure on information search, and the asymmetric evaluation of expected information quality. Additional topics include the effects of heightened accuracy motivation on unintended confirmatory information search, and intentional constraints on unintended confirmation bias. Some practical interventions are suggested to make biased information seeking more transparent and to facilitate optimal decision-making.

Examines whether groups united in opinion solely search for information confirming their beliefs irrespective of the anticipated task or whether they are sensitive to the usefulness of new information. In Experiment 1a, 152 German trainee sergeants (all male, aged 19-24 years) divided into 44 homogenous (similar decision preferences) groups participated. In Experiment 1b, 123 high school students (aged 16-18 years) divided into 41 homogenous (similar decision preferences) groups participated. The experimental design of both experiments is based on a 2 (anticipated group task: justify the decision vs refute counterarguments) x 2 (type of information: supporting vs conflicting) factorial design with repeated measurement on the 2nd factor. In Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2, 50 percent of the groups were given the impression that justification of their decisions would have to be given while the other groups believed they would have to refute counterarguments. The goal of Experiment 2 (99 college students aged 18-20 years) was to provide a more rigorous test of the idea that task sensitivity of homogeneous groups' information search depends on the groups' confidence in the correctness of their decision. Participants were divided into 33 homogenous (similar decision preferences) groups (1 group was subsequently excluded from analysis). Experiment 2 was based on a 2 (group confidence: high vs moderate) x 2 (anticipated group task: justify the decision vs refute counterarguments) x 2 (type of information: supporting vs conflicting) factorial design with repeated measurement on the 3rd factor. In Experiment 3, individual confidence in participants' capability to reach an optimal decision was successfully manipulated to instill either high confidence or moderate confidence. Results show that task sensitivity depends on the groups' confidence in the correctness of their decision. When expected to support a decision, moderately confident groups displayed a strong confirmation bias while exhibiting balanced information search, even seeking out counterarguments in preparation to support their chosen standpoint. Highly confident groups demonstrated a strong confirmation bias independent of the anticipated task requirements. It is concluded that heterogeneous groups should be beneficial for group performance when group performance benefits from adapting the group information search to the varying task requirements.

Escalation of commitment denotes decision makers' increased reinvestment of resources in a losing course of action. Despite the relevance of this topic, little is known about how information is processed in escalation situations, that is, whether decision makers who receive negative outcome feedback on their initial decision search for and/or process information biasedly and whether these biases contribute to escalating commitment. Contrary to a widely cited study by E. J. Conlon and J. M. Parks (1987), in 3 experiments, the authors found that biases do not occur on the level of information search. Neither in a direct replication and extension of the original study with largely increased test power (Experiment 1) nor under methodologically improved conditions (Experiments 2 and 3) did decision makers responsible for failure differ from nonresponsible decision makers with regards to information search, and no selective search for information supporting the initial decision or voting for further reinvestment was observed. However, Experiments 3 and 4 show that the evaluation of the previously sought information is biased among participants who were responsible for initiating the course of action. Mediation analyses show that this evaluation bias in favor of reinvestment partially mediated the responsibility effect on escalation of commitment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Group members tend to be biased in their evaluation of the information discussed. The present study aimed to disentangle the effects of preference consistency, social validation, and ownership on information evaluation in a single experimental design. Participants first received information about a personnel selection task. After having made a decision, they read a transcript of a fictitious discussion. In the transcript, preference consistency, social validation, and ownership of information were orthogonally manipulated as within-subjects factors. As hypothesized, preference consistency, social validation, and ownership all increased the perceived quality of information. Furthermore, participants intended to discuss a larger proportion of their preference-consistent information than of their preference-inconsistent information. This discussion bias was significantly associated with the evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent information. These results provide the first empirical demonstration that the evaluation of information in groups is characterized by three distinct biases and that biased evaluation of information may contribute to biased discussion of information. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biased assimilation is the tendency to evaluate belief-consistent information more positively than belief-inconsistent information. Previous research has demonstrated that biased assimilation is due to an inconsistency between an argument and the recipient's position toward this argument. The present research revealed that an inconsistency between a source's position (independently of the argument) and the recipient's position is also responsible for biased assimilation. In two studies, participants evaluated arguments stated by a politician. Party affiliation of the politician was correctly labeled, incorrectly labeled, or not labeled. The politicians' arguments were evaluated more favorably by their respective voters when party affiliation was correctly labeled. This biased evaluation diminished when party affiliation was not labeled and even slightly reversed when party affiliation was incorrectly labeled. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The individual preference effect supplements the predominant group-level explanations for the failure of groups to solve hidden profiles. Even in the absence of dysfunctional group-level processes, group members tend to stick to their suboptimal initial decision preferences due to preference-consistent evaluation of information. However, previous experiments demonstrating this effect retained two group-level processes, namely (a) social validation of information supporting the group members' initial preferences and (b) presentation of the additional information in a discussion format. Therefore, it was unclear whether the individual preference effect depends on the co-occurrence of these group-level processes. Here, we report two experiments demonstrating that the individual preference effect is indeed an individual-level phenomenon. Moreover, by a comparison to real interacting groups, we can show that even when all relevant information is exchanged and when no coordination losses occur, almost half of all groups would fail to solve hidden profiles due to the individual preference effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being fed up with something is a prevalent and fundamental human experience. Although the relevance of mental satiation, that is, the process of becoming fed up with an action, is highly acknowledged in organizational psychology, almost no empirical research has examined this concept. Here, the authors take a social cognitive neuroscience approach to mental satiation. By building on and extending the classic work of Lewin and Karsten, a new model of mental satiation is proposed that focuses on the cognitive, motivational, and neural processes underlying mental satiation. The model starts with the assumption that repeated performance of an action undermines one's need for competence and hence leads to a loss of intrinsic motivation. The authors then distinguish between two phases of the satiation process: The first phase is characterized by a loss of intrinsic motivation to perform the action. The second phase starts when the intrinsic motivation has vanished and volitional control is required to continue the action. The authors predict that the loss of intrinsic motivation in the first phase of the satiation process is correlated with a decrease in activity in brain regions associated with positive hedonic experience, such as the nucleus accumbens, the ventral pallidum, and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. In contrast, the growing aversion toward the action during the second phase of the satiation process is predicted to he correlated with an increase in activity in brain regions associated with unpleasant affect and volitional control, such as the amygdala, the anterior insula, and the anterior cingulate cortex.