Geänderte Inhalte

Examined the active learning hypothesis of the job demand control (JDC) model. 81 college students participated in an experimental office workplace simulation with varying demands and control levels. A posttest, in which participants continued working at their task, but without any manipulation of demands and control, was used to determine active learning transfer effects in an unconfounded fashion. Results revealed that high demands had a positive effect on quantitative performance without affecting task accuracy. However, a high control level resulted in a speed-accuracy tradeoff with subjects working slower in high control conditions, but with greater accuracy than participants in the low control conditions. In conclusion, while the positive main effect of high demands on quantitative performance support the active learning hypothesis of the JDC model, the mixed effects for control somewhat contradict this.

In 1999, van der Doef and Maes published a systematic review focusing on the Job-Demand-Control (JDC) model (Karasek, 1979) and the Job Demand-Control (-Support) (JDCS) model (Johnson & Hall, 1988) in relation to psychological well-being. Their review covered the period from 1979 to 1997. The present paper updates and extends this review. Covering research from 83 studies published between 1998 and 2007, our review revealed three major results: First, support for additive effects of demands, control, and social support on general psychological well-being is almost always found if the sample size is sufficient. Second, although there was consistent evidence for additive effects in relation to job-related well-being in cross-sectional studies, support rates were lower in longitudinal data. Thus, reciprocal or reversed causation might account for part of the association between JDC/JDCS dimensions and job-related well-being. Finally, evidence for interactive effects as predicted by the buffer hypotheses of the JDC/JDCS model was very weak overall. However, the pattern of results indicates that this is due neither to spurious evidence for such interactions nor to small effect sizes. Instead, our results suggest that buffering effects depend on whether or not demands and control are based on qualitatively identical JDC/JDCS dimensions (matching principle). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Es wird im Überblick informiert über sozialpsychologische Theorien zu Urteilen, Entscheidungen, Leistung und Lernen in Gruppen. Dabei wird der Versuch unternommen, das jeweils verbindende Prinzip theoretischer Hauptströmungen in den genannten Forschungsbereichen zu verdeutlichen und wichtige theoretische Ansätze solchen Strömungen zuzuordnen. Ohne Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit werden beispielhaft zentrale Phänomene herausgegriffen, an denen dann jeweils die hinter den Hauptströmungen stehenden Prinzipien verdeutlicht werden. Inhaltlich stehen dabei Gruppenurteile und Gruppenentscheidungen sowie theoretische Zugänge zur Gruppenleistung im Mittelpunkt. Weitere inhaltliche Schwerpunkte sind individuelle und kollektive Lernprozesse in Gruppen und deren Einfluss auf das Gruppenergebnis.

Investigated differential effects of social validation on the decisional impact of preference-consistent and preference-inconsistent information in group decision-making. While shared information is often considered to have a stronger impact on group decisions than unshared information due to social validation of the former, it was hypothesized that this explanation would only apply to information which contradicted group members' initial preferences (i.e., preference-inconsistent). In 2 experiments, a total of 394 college students (290 female, mean age 22.53 years) studied fictitious group discussion protocols regarding the suitability of potential candidates for a job. Information provided in the protocols was manipulated to be preference-consistent or preference-inconsistent. Participants rated the suitability of candidates prior to and after reading group discussion protocols. As predicted, social validation only increased the decisional impact of preference-inconsistent information. In a sample of 80 male college students (mean age 25.84 years), Experiment 3 replicated these results in an interactive, face-to-face group-discussion setting. Finally, implications and limitations of the findings are discussed.

Im Rahmen einer kritischen Sichtung der Entrapment-Forschung wird zunächst der Erkenntnisstand zu den Teilaspekten (entrapment, escalation of commitment, sunk cost) zusammengefasst. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Forschung steht die Frage, warum und unter welchen Bedingungen Menschen irrational an fehlgehenden Handlungen festhalten oder diese sogar intensivieren. Es wird auf drei zentrale Defizite dieser Forschung eingegangen, die in einer Ignoranz gegenüber themenverwandten Forschungsrichtungen, einem ungenügenden Nachweis der Irrationalität von Entrapment sowie einer oberflächlichen Theoriebildung bestehen. Daraus werden zwei wesentliche Zukunftsperspektiven für die Entrapment-Forschung abgeleitet: Postuliert wird, dass das Verständnis von Entrapment-Prozessen wesentlich davon profitieren wird, wenn man zwischen Verlustignoranz auf der einen und Verlustbindung auf der anderen Seite differenziert. Als zweite Zukunftsperspektive wird die Relevanz von Lernprozessen im Kontext von Entrapment herausgearbeitet.

Insgesamt drei denkbare psychologische Ansätze zur Erklärung des deutschen Rückstands in den Zukunftstechnologien, etwa Informations- und Biotechnologien, werden erörtert. Für die erste mögliche Erklärung, nämlich eine generelle deutsche Risikoscheu, finden sich in der referierten psychologischen Risikoforschung keine überzeugenden Belege. Als fruchtbarer erweist sich der zweite Ansatz, dass nämlich situative Bedingungen, vor allem das Phänomen der sogenannten ``gelernten Sorglosigkeit'', deutsche Unternehmen die rechtzeitigen Weichenstellungen versäumen ließen. Überdies könnten, wie der dritte Erklärungsversuch zeigt, auch Fehlerquellen in strategischen Entscheidungsprozessen an der mangelnden Zukunftsorientierung beteiligt gewesen sein. Implikationen im Hinblick auf mögliche Interventionen werden diskutiert.

Aus dissonanztheoretischen Forschungen geht hervor, dass Personen, die eine vorläufige oder endgültige Entscheidung getroffen haben, vermehrt nach unterstützenden Informationen suchen und widersprechende Informationen vermeiden (Konfirmationsbias). Neuere Untersuchungen belegen, dass auch Gruppen als Entscheidungsträger für solche Selbstbestätigungsmechanismen, die die Qualität von Entscheidungen bedrohen können, anfällig sind. Es wird informiert über zwei experimentelle Studien, in denen untersucht wurde, ob bestimmte Formen einer heterogenen Gruppenzusammensetzung eine ausgewogenere Informationssuche bewirken können. Daten wurden an Stichproben von insgesamt 636 Gymnasiastinnen und Gymnasiasten erhoben. Durchgängig zeigte sich in beiden Experimenten, dass Gruppen, deren Mitglieder heterogene Entscheidungspräferenzen aufweisen, eine niedrigere Sicherheit bezüglich einer vorläufigen Gruppenentscheidung angeben und einen geringeren Konfirmationsbias aufweisen als Gruppen, deren Mitglieder vorab die selbe Alternative favorisiert hatten. Hingegen hatten weder Heterogenität bezüglich der Persönlichkeitsprofile der Gruppenmitglieder (Experiment I) noch Geschlechtsheterogenität (Experiment II) einen Einfluss auf die Entscheidungssicherheit oder den Konfirmationsbias. Die Ergebnisse werden insbesondere im Hinblick auf ihre Implikationen für Gruppenentscheidungen in der Praxis diskutiert.

In research on selective exposure to information, people have been found to predominantly seek information supporting rather than conflicting with their opinion. In most of these studies, participants were allowed to search for as many pieces of information as they liked. However, in many situations, the amount of information that people can search for is restricted. We report four experiments addressing this issue. Experiment 1 suggests that objective limits regarding the maximum number of pieces of information the participants could search for increases the preference for selecting supporting over conflicting information. In Experiment 2, just giving participants a cue about information scarcity induces the same effect, even in the absence of any objective restrictions. Finally, Experiment 3 and 4 clarify the underlying psychological process by showing that information limits increase selective exposure to information because information search is guided by the expected information quality, which is basically biased towards supporting information, and information limits act to reinforce this tendency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical evidence on selective exposure to information after decisions is contradictory: Whereas many studies have found a preference for information that is consistent with one's prior decision, some have found a preference for inconsistent information. The authors propose that different available information quantities moderate these contradictory findings. Four studies confirmed this expectation. When confronted with 10 pieces of information, decision makers systematically preferred decision-consistent information, whereas when confronted with only 2 pieces of information, they strongly preferred decision-inconsistent information (Study 1). This effect was not due to differences in processing complexity (Study 2) or dissonance processes (Study 3) but could be traced back to different salient selection criteria: When confronted with 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was information direction (consistent vs. inconsistent), which caused a preference for inconsistent information In contrast, when confronted with more than 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was expected information quality, which caused a preference for consistent information (Study 4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimentelle Untersuchungsergebnisse zu den Bedingungen der Realitätsflucht bei Entscheidungsprozessen in Kleingruppen werden dargestellt. Die Basis der drei Experimente bildet ein integratives Modell des Entscheidungsautismus, in dem Selbstbestätigungsprozesse und Fehlentscheidungen von Gruppen auf der Basis einer dissonanztheoretischen Analyse von kollektiver Kritiklosigkeit in Entscheidungsgremien (groupthink) beschrieben werden. In Experiment I, an dem 207 16- bis 20-jährige Gymnasiasten in Dreiergruppen beteiligt waren, wurde der Einfluss von Gruppenkohäsion und -homogenität auf den Entscheidungsautismus in Gruppen untersucht. In Experiment II wurde bei 231 16- bis 60-jährigen der Einfluss von natürlichen versus künstlichen Gruppenkonflikten auf den Entscheidungsautismus analysiert, und in Experiment III wurde bei 213 Oberstufenschülern den Effekten von Rechtfertigungsdruck auf den Entscheidungsautismus nachgegangen. Die Befunde beziehen sich auf (1) die Häufigkeit von Entscheidungsautismus in Kleingruppen und bei Individuen, (2) die Unabhängigkeit des Entscheidungsautismus von hoher sozio-emotionaler Gruppenkohäsion und deren Interaktion mit der Gruppenhomogenität, (3) die Abhängigkeit des Entscheidungsautismus von hoher Gruppenhomogenität, (4) die Reduzierbarkeit des Entscheidungsautismus durch die Einführung eines künstlichen Konflikts in der Gruppe (über die Einführung eines Teufelsanwalts) und (5) die Verstärkung des Entscheidungsautismus in Gruppen durch Rechtfertigungsdruck. Aus den Ergebnissen werden Möglichkeiten zur Prävention von und Intervention bei Entscheidungsautismus abgeleitet.

In Germany, the introduction of the Euro has been one of the most important economic changes in the last decades. This paper reviews how the introduction of the Euro has affected price trend perceptions as well as comparisons of DM and Euro prices. Prices in Euro, relative to DM, are typically overestimated, which is due to people's failure to revise their initial (faulty) expectations of price increases. In addition, due to anchoring effects, the comparison of prices in DM and Euro results in biased judgments. For instance, while people focus on nominal numbers, they neglect the real amount of money (Euro illusion).

In five studies we show that the introduction of the Euro influences price estimations and the perception of salaries among people in Germany. People confronted with wages given in Euros compared to the German Mark (DM) showed a reduced willingness to face long distances to get to work when accepting a job offer. When asked to price various consumer goods appropriately, they estimated higher prices if they used the ‘Euro’ currency compared to price estimations made in DM. This phenomenon only occurred with regard to the Euro, but not in comparison with other currencies (cf. the British Pound and Austrian Schilling). The differing price estimations between the Euro and the German Mark were not influenced by participants' attitude towards the Euro. Moreover, it turned out that they depended on how the judgement context was framed. Only if participants expected to make price estimations for shops in their home country, Germany, did the familiar nominal DM figures serve as an anchor heightening the estimated prices in Euro. The same effect disappeared if participants were instructed to make their price estimations for shops in a foreign country (Ireland). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present experiment on the phenomenon of psychic satiation expands on the work of Karsten (1928) and Lewin (1928). Psychic satiation denotes a loss of intrinsic motivation when the same action is performed repeatedly. Although many studies have shown the high theoretical and practical relevance of this phenomenon, the conditions which lead to or reinforce psychic satiation have rarely been investigated empirically. Based on the concept of psychic satiation as formulated by Karsten and Lewin and refined by Schulz-Hardt, Rott, Meinken, and Frey (in press), we predicted that psychic satiation will increase if the task does not lend itself to being carried out ``peripherally'' (i.e., as an almost unconscious incidental action) and if it has high personal relevance. These predictions were investigated in an experiment with 66 high-school students who performed different versions of the ``Konzentrations-Leistungs-Test'' (concentration-performance-test, KLT). The results are largely in line with our predictions. In addition, the results indicate that the relation between satiation and performance is moderated by personal relevance and the induced task characteristic.

Decision-making groups are often expected to function as ``think tanks'' performing a careful ``reality testing'' decision process. However, as social psychological group research shows, several mechanisms may hinder them from effectively fulfilling this function. One of these is a biased search for information supporting the alternative favored by most or all group members. In this article, we summarize our recent and current research on confirmatory information search in group decision making. We focus on how diversity of opinions within a group can counteract biased group information search and what factors facilitate this debiasing effect of group diversity. We also discuss further research topics with regard to biased group information seeking, and we briefly outline the implications of our results for the design of groups expected to successfully work as think tanks.

Decision-making groups in organizations are often expected to function as a 'think tank' and to perform 'reality testing' to detect the best alternative. A biased search for information supporting the group's favored alternative impairs a group's ability to fulfill these requirements. In a two-factorial experiment with 201 employees and managers from various economic and public organizations, genuine and contrived dissent were investigated as counterstrategies to biased information seeking. Genuine dissent was manipulated by forming three-person groups whose members either all favored the same alternative individually (homogeneous groups) or consisted of a minority and a majority faction with regard to their favored alternative (heterogeneous groups). Contrived dissent was varied by the use or nonuse of the 'devil's advocacy' technique. The results demonstrate that heterogeneity was more effective in preventing a confirmatory information-seeking bias than devil's advocacy was. Confidence was identified as an important mediator. Implications for the design of the interventions aimed at facilitating reality testing in group decision making are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Hidden profiles are decision-making tasks in which groups have the potential to outperform individual decision-makers. This paper has two purposes: first, to provide a conceptual analysis of how the group potential for solving hidden profiles can be measured; second, to empirically determine the solution rates hidden profile groups would achieve: in the absence of any group processes (i.e. the group potential); and in the absence of any dysfunctional group processes. Design/methodology/approach: The group potential was determined by averaging the group members’ decision quality prior to the discussion. To determine the hidden profile solution rates in the absence of any dysfunctional group processes, the standard hidden profile procedure was modified so that nothing but the individual-level constraints could hamper the solution of hidden profiles. Findings: The actual group performance was significantly higher than the group potential, but significantly lower than the performance in the no dysfunctional group processes condition. Hence, dysfunctional group processes interfere with the realization of process gains. However, even in the absence of any dysfunctional group processes, groups did not always solve hidden profiles. Finally, the detrimental group process hampering the solution of hidden profiles does not seem to be biased information pooling favoring shared information but rather insufficient amount of information pooling. Practical implications: The results indicate that tools, which aim to facilitate the solution of hidden profiles, have to overcome both dysfunctional group processes, and individual-level constraints. Originality/value: This is the first attempt to quantify process gains in hidden profile groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

Common explanations for the failure of groups to solve so-called hidden profiles focus on group processes, namely insufficient discussion of unshared information and premature consensus on a suboptimal alternative. As 2 experiments show, even in the absence of such group processes, hidden profiles are hardly ever solved. In Experiment 1, participants first received individual information about a personnel selection task and then read a group discussion protocol containing full information exchange. If the individual information was misleading (hidden profile), most participants failed to detect the correct alternative. In Experiment 2, it was determined that this effect is due to preference-consistent evaluation of information that constitutes an individual-level process mediating the failure of group members to solve hidden profiles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A prominent finding in escalating commitment and entrapment research is the “responsibility effect”: people invest more in a losing course of action or persist with it for longer if they themselves initiated this action (responsibility) as opposed to if it was assigned to them. We argue that this effect is driven by participants’ preferences. Responsible participants usually prefer the chosen alternative since they have chosen it themselves. Non-responsible participants, in contrast, represent a mix of persons who either favor or disfavor the chosen alternative. In two experiments, we demonstrate that responsible participants favor the chosen course of action more strongly than non-responsible participants do, that these preferences facilitate reinvestment in and persistence with the chosen course of action, and that responsibility has no effect over and above this effect of preferences. Non-responsible participants preferring the chosen course of action made similar reinvestments and exhibited similar persistence as responsible participants. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Group discussions tend to focus on information that is already known to all group members prior to discussion (shared information) relative to information that is known to only one group member (unshared information). Further, group decisions are more strongly determined by shared information. However, in most of the pertinent studies, sharedness of information was confounded with preference-consistency; that is, most of the shared information supports the predominant sentiment in the group. A simulated group discussion revealed that shared information - independent of preference consistency - was evaluated as more credible and relevant and was intended to be repeated more often than unshared information. The same effect was observed for preference-consistency of information, independent of sharedness of information. In addition, participants preferred to discuss and request preference-consistent information. The results point out that individual processes of information evaluation and information preference contribute to the dominance of shared information in group discussions and group decisions.